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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THOMAS HUTCHISON*
Let me start off by saying that before the Sentencing Reform Act took
effect nearly half of all offenders sentenced had their punishment determined
by a guideline system that took into account their criminal history and the
severity of the offense. It was a grid that is similar to, but not as complex as,
the grid in the back of the Sentencing Guidelines book. That grid was
administered by the United States Parole Commission. The effect of the
Sentencing Reform Act was to move the guideline decision from the end of the
punishment process to the beginning of the punishment process. There were
consequences that flowed from that change and Judge Heaney has pointed out
some of those consequences. There has been a shift in the relative power, for
some of the participants in the system.1
The Sentencing Reform Act was a delegation to the Sentencing
Commission by Congress of congressional power over sentencing. Congress
could enact guidelines, but I think that Congress wanted to distance itself from
the process. For one thing, most members of Congress do not view themselves
as being elected to sit down and go through pre-sentence reports to determine
what sort of factors ought to go into imposing sentence. They want to focus on
broad public policy issues. The Sentencing Committee was to be a body of
experts who would fine tune and craft guidelines that were detailed and that
were intellectually honest and consistent—tasks that Congress, itself, did not
want to undertake.
Unfortunately, almost after enacting the Guidelines system, Congress
made the task of the Commission more difficult by enacting mandatory
* Thomas W. Hutchison is an attorney with the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
in Washington, D.C., where his duties include representing the interests of the federal public and
community defenders before the U.S. Sentencing Commission and planning and carrying out
sentencing guidelines training programs. A graduate of the University of Wisconsin and of its
law school, Mr. Hutchison served for seventeen years on the staff of the House Judiciary
Committee, most of that time as Chief Counsel to the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice. He was
the House of Representatives staff person principally responsible for the legislation that became
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. He was closely involved in all of the major crime legislation
enacted by Congress in the late 1970s and in the 1980s. Before working on Capitol Hill, Mr.
Hutchison served as a trial attorney in the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department, and as
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Committee’s Practitioner’s Advisory Group, and he is the co-author of Federal Sentencing Law
and Practice and numerous other works on this subject.
1. Editor’s note: See Judge Heaney’s comments, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 398-401 (2000), in
this issue.
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minimums. That presented the Commission with some questions. In the drug
area, where mandatory minimums are based on quantity? If the Commission is
going to have a drug guideline for trafficking offenses that is based on
quantity, does the Commission ignore entirely the Congressional views of
severity as expressed in the mandatory minimums and craft guidelines that it
thinks appropriate and let the mandatory minimums override the Guidelines if
the Commission’s view of severity does not coincide with Congress’s view?
Or does the Commission take the Congressional numbers and work them into
the Guidelines? The consequences of the latter might be much higher
sentences than the Sentencing Commission, left to its own devices, might have
come up with.
Congress, over the years, not only proposed and frequently enacted
mandatory minimums, but also has started to enact directives of varying sorts
for the Commission. Some of the directives were general, for example, to
consider certain factors. Some of them were far more particular, for example,
to enhance by a certain number of levels for certain kinds of conduct. I think
that Professor Goldsmith has correctly stated that one of the serious problems
confronting the new Commission is its relationship with Congress.2
The relationship between the Commission and Congress is a two-way
street. The leadership of both parties in both Houses has to be educated about
how the Guidelines work and what the Commission is seeking to accomplish.
And the leadership, on both sides of the isle, in both Houses, has to be
responsible and restrain some of the more hot-headed members of the body
from enacting laws that are not sound public policy.
I think that Commissioner Goldsmith is correct that the crack episode
damaged the Commission’s credibility with the Hill and that relationship is
going to have to be repaired.
I do not share Professor Goldsmith’s view, however, of how judges made
sentencing decisions before the Guidelines came into effect. I do not think the
freakish way that he described was typical. In fact, I think, it was just the
opposite.
Judges were thoughtful in their imposition of sentences. But, I think it also
undeniable, and certainly Congress found it undeniable, that the result of
having – at the time the Sentencing Reform Act was passed and enacted into
law – over 500 independent decision-makers led to what Judge Heaney has
called “inter-judge disparity.”3 Congress was interested in eliminating that
disparity but not in eliminating discretion entirely. Congress wanted to leave
some room for discretion, and the issue is how much room has been left. I

2. Editor’s note: See Professor Goldsmith’s comments, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 394, 397
(2000), in this issue.
3. Editor’s note: See Judge Heaney’s comments, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 398, 398 (2000), in
this issue.
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think the early Commission was perceived as wanting to discourage
departures. Every time a court would depart, it seemed, there would be a
proposed amendment addressing that departure ground and saying it was no
longer a basis for departure.
If the new Commission wants to encourage judicial discretion and to give
greater room for judges to exercise judgment (as Judge Heaney points out,
judges are appointed for lifetime and given a great deal of power), the
Commission ought to be encouraged.
I was not encouraged to hear Mr. McCloskey’s description of prosecutorial
discretion when he said his office rarely deviates from the strictures of the
Guidelines.4 To me that is not the exercise of discretion; that is the antithesis
of discretion. To say that there is no gun case that could ever arise in his
district that would not be something that you would plea bargain over means,
to me, that you are not exercising discretion, but you are declining to exercise
discretion.
My bottom line is that the Commission’s first task is to repair its relations
with Congress so that Congress can be educated into more constructive modes
of legislating in the crime area rather than in some of the directions it has gone
in the past.

4. Editor’s note: See Mr. McCloskey’s comments, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 391, 391 (2000), in
this issue.

